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 The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker rendered 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) advisory and 
directed appellate courts to use a “reasonableness” standard of review 
when considering criminal sentences.1  The question remained, 
however, of the relationship between the sentencing ranges provided 
by the Guidelines and a “reasonable” sentence.   
 The Seventh Circuit has chosen to grant sentences falling within 
the range proscribed by the Guidelines a presumption of 
reasonableness on appellate review.2 This approach is flawed for two 
reasons: first, the presumption of reasonableness is not supported by 
the Supreme Court’s remedial opinion in Booker and second, the court 
cannot find support for the presumption in the plain meaning of 18 
U.S.C.A. 3553.  Recent cases have highlighted both the flaws in the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
2 United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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court’s rationales in developing the presumption, as well as a 
surprising inconsistency in the court’s application of the presumption.  
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for the 
question of whether Booker’s holding can be harmonized with granting 
a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence falling within the 
Guidelines.  Because the Seventh Circuit has played a notable role in 
the history of the Guidelines, and because the Circuit’s handling of the 
Guidelines post-Booker has been particularly influential, the Seventh 
Circuit’s approaches and rationales for the presumption are likely to be 
featured prominently in the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The Road to Booker 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI   
  
 For decades, the potential conflict between judicial fact-finding in 
criminal sentencing and the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement has 
arisen when defendants’ sentences were affected by factors neither 
admitted nor found by a jury.3  As state and federal statutes have 
increasingly sought to emphasize the virtues of uniformity and 
predictability, the concern that the role of the jury was being usurped 
by mechanical judicial determinations increased as well.  The last 
seven years have seen the Supreme Court clarify the Sixth 
                                                 
3 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197 (1977); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
2
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Amendment’s requirements, and in doing so, have set the stage for the 
current status of the Guidelines.4  
 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court considered a sentence given 
to a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm for unlawful 
purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon.5  The 
sentencing judge determined that the defendant, who had fired shots 
into the home of an African American family, was eligible for an 
extended term of incarceration under New Jersey’s hate crime statute, 
and sentenced him to twelve years.  The Court, in an opinion written 
by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg, held that the defendant’s increased sentence violated the 
Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement.  Because the hate crime 
enhancement increased the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum for the crimes to which the defendant had pled guilty, the 
Sixth Amendment required that it “must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”6  Although the holding was 
limited to situations in which an enhancement resulted in the sentence 
exceeding the statutory maximum, the Court endorsed the more broad 
rule that “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the 
jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of 
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”7 
 Four years later the Court was faced with a similar situation in 
Blakely v. Washington, in which it considered a sentence given to a 
defendant convicted of second-degree kidnapping involving domestic 
violence and the use of a firearm.8  The sentencing judge found that 
the defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty, and imposed a 
sentence of ninety months, more than three years above the statutory 
                                                 
4 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2004).  
5 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
6 Id. at 490. 
7 Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
8 542 U.S. 296 (2004).   
3
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maximum without the enhancement.9  In an opinion written by Justice 
Scalia and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, 
the Court held that because the facts supporting the defendant’s 
additional sentence were neither found beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
jury, nor admitted by the defendant, the sentence violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury.10  Despite the fact that the sentence 
in Blakely was below the statutory maximum, the Court nevertheless 
stated that the issue was controlled by the rule expressed in Apprendi11  
Justice Scalia clarified that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional 
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional 
findings.”12 
 Although the Court was willing to extend Apprendi’s rule to 
encompass any fact that increased a defendant’s punishment above 
what could have been given in its absence, it was not yet ready to 
consider the mandatory Guidelines.13 Even though the Guidelines 
required sentencing judges to make findings of fact that could 
substantially increase a defendant’s sentence, Justice Scalia made clear 
that “[t]he Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no 
opinion on them.”14  
 
II.  UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
 
Freddie Booker was convicted for possessing with the intent to 
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base.15  Upon sentencing, the 
district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant had distributed several hundred grams more than the 92.5 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 303-04. 
11 Id. at 301.   
12 Id. at 303-04. 
13 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 227, 305 n.9 (2004).   
14 Id.   
15 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004) 
4
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grams found by the jury.16   The defendant was eligible for a range of 
thirty years to life in prison under the mandatory Guidelines, and was 
sentenced to the bottom of the range.17  Judge Posner, writing for the 
Seventh Circuit, considered the mandatory nature of the Guidelines to 
be determinative.18  The “difference between allowing a sentencing 
judge to consider a range of factors that may include facts that he 
informally finds…and commanding him to make fact-finding and base 
the sentence (within a narrow band) on them” was, for the court, the 
difference between a constitutional and unconstitutional sentencing 
scheme.19 
Judge Posner was unwilling to allow the consistency of the 
Guidelines to outweigh their constitutional flaws.20  While it was 
“tempting to think that maybe the guidelines can be saved by 
imagining the Sentencing Commission as a kind of super-judge who 
elaborates a code of sentencing principles much a thoughtful real 
judge, operating in a regime of indeterminate sentencing, might do 
informally in an effort to try to make his sentences consistent[,]” the 
importance of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement under Blakely 
could not be ignored.21  
  
A.  Justice Breyer’s Remedial Opinion  
 
That is why we think it fair . . . to assume judicial 
familiarity with a “reasonableness” standard. And that 
is why we believe that appellate judges will prove 
capable of facing with greater equanimity than would 
Justice Scalia what he calls the “daunting prospect” of 
applying such a standard across the board. United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-63 (2005).  
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 512.   
19 Id.   
20 Id.   
21 Id.     
5
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 In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court continued the 
reasoning of Apprendi and Blakely and found that the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury requirement prohibited mandatory judicial fact-
finding that determined a defendant’s sentence absent specific jury 
findings.22  The opinion, while seemingly a logical continuation of 
Apprendi and Blakely, was notable for the bifurcated majorities 
responsible for the Court’s constitutional and remedial opinions.23  
First, a majority comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that the Guidelines were 
unconstitutional.24  Next, a majority made up of Justices Breyer, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist fashioned 
the remedy.25 
Writing for the majority in the constitutional opinion, Justice 
Stevens noted that Sixth Amendment rights “are implicated whenever 
a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”26 In short, 
the Guidelines were unconstitutional so long judges were required to 
act in the role traditionally reserved for juries.27 
 Although the mandatory nature of the Guidelines was 
unconstitutional, the question remained of how exactly to fix them.28 
Writing for a separate remedial majority, Justice Breyer adopted an 
approach neither party had sought and determined that the Guidelines 
could be salvaged if the portions making them mandatory were 
severed from the rest of the statute.29 First, § 3553(b)(1) was severed 
to remove the provision that required sentencing courts to impose a 
sentence within the Guidelines range, which transformed them from 
                                                 
22 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
23 Id. at 226, 244.   
24 Id. at 226-27. 
25 Id. at 246. 
26 Id. at 232. 
27 Id. at 231-33. 
28 Id. at 245. 
29 Id. 
6
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mandatory to “effectively advisory.”30 Second, and most importantly 
for this note, the Court severed §3742(e), which set forth the 
mandatory de novo review appellate courts used for any departures 
from the Guidelines.31   
Justice Breyer acknowledged that excising § 3742(e) left the 
Guidelines with no clear standard of appellate review, but quickly 
dismissed concerns that appellate courts would be unable to function 
without a statutory standard.32 Even in the absence of explicit statutory 
language, Justice Breyer wrote, courts can infer review standards from 
related statutory language, the structure of the statute, and the sound 
administration of justice.33 Justice Breyer noted that the appellate 
courts were not without experience applying a reasonableness standard 
to criminal sentences.34  Prior to 2003, the Guidelines had specifically 
directed the appellate courts to use a type of reasonableness analysis 
when reviewing sentences falling outside the proscribed Guidelines 
range.35 Additionally, the text of the Guidelines had “long required 
their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of 
departures . . . and on review of sentences imposed where there was no 
applicable Guideline . . .”36 
The standard for the Guidelines was now clear, at least to 
Justice Breyer: “The district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those guidelines and take them into account 
when sentencing . . . The courts of appeals review sentencing 




                                                 
30 Id. at 259. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 259-60. 
33 Id. at 260-61. 
34 Id. at 261. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 262. 
37 Id. at 264. 
7
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B.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
 
What I anticipate will happen is that ‘unreasonableness’ 
review will produce a discordant symphony of different 
standards, varying from court to court…38  
 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Booker expressed skepticism about 
both the legal reasoning behind the remedial opinion and about the 
practical effect of the “reasonableness” standard of review for the 
appellate courts.39 He noted that contrary to the Justice Breyer’s 
assurance that appellate courts had sufficient experience applying a 
reasonableness standard or review, such a standard was in actually in 
contrast to the bulk accepted practice of appellate sentencing review.40 
In Justice Scalia’s opinion, applying a standard of review to the 
entirety of sentencing appeals that had previously only applied to 
16.7% of cases was a recipe for uncertainty.41  
 Justice Scalia summed up his apprehension about an uncertain 
future in the closing lines of his dissent.42 He wondered,  
 
Will appellate review for ‘unreasonableness’ preserve 
de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging district 
court judges from sentencing outside Guidelines 
ranges? Will it simply add another layer of unfettered 
judicial discretion to the sentencing process? Or will it 
be a mere formality, used by busy appellate judges only 
to ensure that busy district court judges say all the right 
things when they explain how they have exercised their 
newly restored discretion? Time may tell, but today’s 
remedial majority will not.43  
                                                 
38 Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 303-04.  
40 Id. at 310-11. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 313. 
43 Id. 
8
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III.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPS A STANDARD OF  
PRESUMPTIVE REASONABLENESS 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the post-Booker 
reasonableness standard of review coalesced over the course of three 
cases in mid 2005.44 The first two of these cases, United States v. 
George and United States v. Dean, foreshadowed the court’s desire to 
find a standard of review for Guideline sentences that respected 
Booker’s remedial opinion.45 In the last of these cases, United States v. 
Mykytiuk, the Seventh circuit expressly adopted for the first time a 
presumption of reasonableness for any within-the-guidelines 
sentence.46 In each of these cases, the court took pains to reiterate the 
post-Booker advisory status of the Guidelines while simultaneously 
developing a standard of review that elevated the Guidelines above the 
other § 3553(a) factors.47  
 
A.  George and Dean Set the Stage 
 
 In George, the court hinted that although Booker made clear 
that the Guidelines were advisory, the Seventh Circuit would 
nevertheless still be willing to treat them with a respect not necessarily 
afforded to the other sentencing factors in § 3553(a).48 The defendant 
in George had pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to defraud the 
United States and was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment as well 
as roughly $614,000 in restitution.49  The defendant argued that under  
Booker’s interpretation, his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment’s 
                                                 
44 See United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Dean, 414 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th. 
Cir. 2005).  
45 George, 403 F.3d 470; Dean, 414 F.3d 725.  
46 Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606.  
47 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a); George, 403 F.3d 470; Dean, 414 F.3d 725; 
Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606. 
48 George, 403 F.3d at 472-73. 
49 Id. 
9
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jury requirement.50  In the opinion, Judge Easterbrook made clear that 
the court would not expect a sentencing judge to “record all of the 
considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it [was] enough to 
calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies 
outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.”51 The implication of 
that statement was clear: the court would only require explanation 
from a sentencing judge if the sentence imposed lay outside the 
Guideline range.52 If a district court judge wished to avoid addressing 
the factors in § 3553(a), he could continue to find safe harbor within 
the Guidelines.53 
 Three months later in Dean, the court addressed more directly 
the status that the Guidelines would be given in post-Booker 
reasonableness review.54 In Dean, the defendant argued that the 
sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on the range calculated by 
the Guidelines and did not adequately consider the other factors in § 
3553(a).55 Writing for the court, Judge Posner acknowledged that 
sentencing judges are required to consider the relevant factors in § 
3553(a) , even noting the sentencing factors’ “new vitality” in the 
exercise of sentencing discretion.56  
 This apparent respect for the parity of sentencing factors was 
immediately tempered, however, by what Judge Posner considered to 
be the “practical objection[s]” to the defendant’s argument that the 
sentencing judge should consider all the § 3553(a) factors equally.57 
Despite the plain language of § 3553(a), the court was unwilling to 
increase the workload of sentencing judges (and by extension, 
appellate justices) by requiring them to consider these factors in every 
                                                 
50 Id. at 472.   
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (citing United States. v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th 
Cir.2005)).  
57 Dean, 414 F.3d at 729. 
10
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case.58 In support of this reasoning, Judge Posner bemoaned the 
“vague and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended” nature of the 
factors listed in § 3553(a).59 Showing a noteworthy disdain for the 
statutory factors, Judge Posner pointed to the “interminable character 
of inquiry into the meaning and application of each of the 
‘philosophical’ concepts” in reaffirming George’s treatment of within-
the-guidelines sentences.60 
 Additionally, the court stated in Dean (without citation) that 
Booker “requires the sentencing judge first to compute the guidelines 
sentence just as he would have done before Booker, and then . . . to 
decide whether the guidelines sentence is the correct sentence to give 
the particular defendant.”61 This formula did not by itself bestow 
presumptive reasonableness, but it did grant the Guidelines a 
significant priority that is unsupported in Booker.62 By enshrining this 
process as one “required” by Booker, the court embraced a formulaic 
approach for the Guidelines while rejecting a formulaic approach 
when addressing the factors listed in § 3553(a).63 The calculation of 
the appropriate Guidelines sentence, of course, cannot be anything 
other than formulaic; what is remarkable about the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach is its use of that determination.64 After Dean, the Guidelines 
remained not only the sole factor that must be taken into account in 
each sentence, but the factor that must be taken into account prior to 









61 Id. at 727. 
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B.  Mykytiuk elevates the Guidelines  
 
The best way to express the new balance, in our view, 
is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly 
calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.66  
 
 With this uncited declaration, the Seventh Circuit carried 
George and Dean to their natural conclusions and effectively elevated 
the Guidelines beyond a purely advisory status.67 Writing for the court, 
Judge Wood framed the issue presented as a choice between two 
extremes: the court could grant per se reasonableness to the Guidelines 
at one extreme, or use “a clean slate that ignores the proper Guidelines 
range” at the other.68 While acknowledging that the former standard 
would obviously conflict with Booker’s constitutional analysis and the 
latter would be inconsistent with Booker’s remedy, Judge Wood 
attempted to strike a middle ground between these two extremes.69  
 Explaining how the court reached its conclusion, Judge Wood 
pointed out that the Guidelines “represent at this point eighteen years’ 
worth of careful consideration of the proper sentence for federal 
offenses.”70 It was natural to assume, therefore, that the Supreme 
Court intended for the Guidelines to continue to play an important role 
in sentencing.71 Many, or even most, sentences would and should 
continue to fall within the applicable Guideline range.72 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that a properly calculated Guidelines sentence was 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness at the appellate 
level.73  “While we fully expect that it will be a rare Guidelines 
                                                 
66 United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 607. 
69 Id. at 607-08.  
70 Id. at 607. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 608. 
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                 Volume 2, Issue 1                 Fall 2006 
247 
sentence that is unreasonable,” judge Wood wrote, “the Court’s charge 
that we measure each defendant’s sentence against the factors set forth 
in § 3553 (a) requires the door to be left open for this possibility.”74 
 
IV.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH CANNOT FIND SUPPORT  
IN BOOKER OR § 3553(A) 
 
The court was careful in Mykytiuk to portray its decision as 
merely granting the Guidelines the status to which they were 
“entitled”.75 This deferential approach, however, does not find support 
in Justice Breyer’s remedial Booker opinion or the relevant text of § 
3553(a).76  The Seventh Circuit’s grant of presumptive reasonableness 
to within-the-guidelines sentences is at best unsupported by Booker’s 
remedial opinion, and in some respects contrary to the opinion.77 
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s Booker opinion suggests that the 
Court intended to grant the Guidelines preferential status in relation to 
the other factors in § 3553(a).78 Justice Breyer noted in the remedial 
opinion that the appropriate standard of appellate review could be 
inferred from pre-2003 practice, where sentences falling outside the 
applicable Guideline range were measured for reasonableness against 
§ 3553(a) factors.79 Because § 3553(a) remained in effect after Booker, 
the Court directed appellate courts to use those factors, as they have in 
the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.80   
 Justice Breyer also pointed out that even without the mandatory 
provisions of § 3553(b)(1), the Guidelines “continue[] to provide for 
appeals from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial 
judge sentences within or outside the Guidelines range in the exercise 
                                                 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a); 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq. 
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of his discretionary power under § 3553(a)).”81 Had the remedial 
majority intended to grant within-the-guidelines sentences a 
presumption of reasonableness, or any preferential treatment, it seems 
unlikely that they would have specified that sentences both within and 
outside the Guidelines range should be measured for reasonableness 
against § 3553(a) in this manner. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
dissent, “[i]f the majority thought…the Guidelines not only had to be 
‘considered’ (as the amputated statute requires) but generally to be 
followed—its opinion would surely say so.”82  Instead, the remedial 
opinion explicitly states that the “numerous factors” listed in § 3553(a) 
“will guide appellate courts . . . in determining whether a sentence is 
reasonable.”83 
This lack of authority within Booker supporting a presumption 
of reasonableness is reflected by the citations within the Mykytiuk 
decision itself.84 Nowhere in the opinion does Judge Wood cite to a 
specific portion of Booker that supports the presumption.85 Instead, the 
portion of the opinion that expressly creates the presumption merely 
points out that Booker requires the district courts to consult the 
Guidelines and that the Sentencing Commission will continue to revise 
the Guidelines in light of both district and appellate court 
decisionmaking.86 Immediately following these two points, Judge 
Wood states that the Guidelines are “entitled” to the rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness. 87  
The Seventh Circuit’s grant of presumptive reasonableness to 
within-the-Guidelines sentences also conflicts with the plain language 
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a).88  Nowhere does the statute suggest a 
                                                 
81 Id. at 260. 
82 Id. at 307. 
83 Id. at 261.   
84 See generally United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005).  
85 Id. at 608. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 10 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) states in relevant part:  
14
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particular order in which the factors should be considered, much less a 
mandate that the Guidelines be considered first.89  The Seventh 
Circuit’s directive to only consider the statutory factors after 
calculating the appropriate Guidelines sentence conflicts with Justice 
Scalia’s observation that § 3553(a) itself “provides no order of priority 
among all those factors.”90  It seems difficult to imagine that under a 
regime of advisory Guidelines, a statutory factor that appears fourth 
out of seven should be given a priority absent specific statutory 
language.91 
By elevating the Guidelines above the other factors listed in § 
3553(a), the Seventh Circuit is in danger of deferring to precisely the 
kind of “superjudge” Judge Posner warned against in his Booker 
                                                                                                                   
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) 
of this subsection.  The court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider--(1) the nature an 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness 
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; . . . to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; . . . to protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant; and . . . to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . 
. . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set for in the guidelines . . . issued by the 
Sentencing Commission . . . 
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing 
Commission . . . 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.   
15
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opinion.92  In justifying the presumption of reasonableness created in 
Mykutiuk, Judge Wood relied on the “careful consideration” that has 
gone into the Guidelines over the last two decades, but that 
consideration is not synonymous with the factors listed in § 3553(a).93  
Since their inception, the principal goal of the Guidelines has been 
uniformity of sentencing throughout the federal system, not the 
consideration of § 3553(a) factors.94When appointed by Congress in 
1985, the Sentencing Commission was given the primary task of 
decreasing the “unjustifiably wide” disparities that existed within 
federal sentencing.95  In doing so, the Commission made certain 
concessions and compromises that took a wide range of factors into 
consideration, but the Guidelines were not intended to replace the § 
3553(a) factors.96   
 
V.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF 
REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
 
Just as opera stars often go on singing after being shot, 
stabbed, or poisoned, so judicial opinions often survive 
what could be fatal blows.97  
 
 Four recent cases have demonstrated a surprising inconsistency 
in the court’s application of the presumption of reasonableness for 
within-the-guidelines sentences.98 In United States v. Jointer, the court 
addressed an eighty-seven month sentence given to a defendant 
convicted of distribution of crack cocaine and possession with intent to 
                                                 
92 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 512 (7thCir. 2004).     
93 United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). 
94 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988). 
95 Id.  
96 Id.   
97 Booker, 375 F.3d at 516 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting). 
98 See United States v. Jointer, 457 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hankton, 463 F.3d 626 (7th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez, 462 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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distribute crack cocaine.99 In the district court, the sentencing judge 
calculated the defendant’s Guideline range, found several 
enhancements as well as several subtractions, and found the applicable 
Guideline range to be 135 to 168 months.100 The district court then 
turned to the § 3553(a) factors and found that that, among other 
factors, the need for sentencing consistency across the country 
justified the reduction of the 100-1 ratio between crack and powder 
cocaine sentences to 20-1.101 The sentence, after calculating the 
Guideline range and consulting the § 3553(a) factors was eighty-seven 
months.102   
 Judge Ripple, writing for the court, held that, by using § 
3553(a) (6) to reduce the disparity between sentences for powder 
cocaine and those for crack, the sentencing judge erred as a matter of 
law.103 The court noted that although the Guidelines are advisory, the 
court must “respectfully adhere to the 100-1 ratio that Congress has 
decided to implement….”104 Despite the fact that the district court 
judge followed the precise procedure laid out in Mykytiuk, the court 
nevertheless held that the district court’s sentencing discretion did not 
include overriding a particular aspect of the Guidelines with any other 
factor from § 3553(a).105 Even while limiting the district court’s ability 
to implement § 3553(a) factors if they conflict with the Guideline 
sentencing range, the court repeatedly stressed that its decision 
recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines.106  
 Two days after Jointer, the court was faced with the issue of 
whether current Guidelines may be applied retroactively without 
triggering ex post facto problems in United States v. Demaree.107 
                                                 




103 Id. at 687. 
104 Id. at 686 
105 Id. at 686-87(7th Cir. 2006). 
106 Id. 687. 
107 United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Judge Posner wrote for the court and held that because the Guidelines 
were no longer mandatory, they could be applied retroactively without 
raising ex post facto concerns.108 The court likened the “purely 
advisory” Guidelines to a joint resolution of Congress urging heavier 
sentences to white-collar criminals, or an increase in prison funding 
intended to allow for lengthier sentences.109 None of the analogies 
drawn by the court, however, squarely addressed the effect of a 
presumption of reasonableness.  
 The court did acknowledge the argument that a presumption of 
reasonableness granted to even an advisory Guideline system could 
raise ex post facto issues, but immediately dismissed such concerns 
out of hand.110 Judge Posner wrote that the sentencing judge “is not 
required—or even permitted—to ‘presume’ that a sentence within the 
guidelines range is the correct sentence and if he wants to depart give 
a reason why it’s not correct. All he has to do is consider the 
guidelines and make sure that the sentence he gives is within the 
statutory range and consistent with the sentencing factors listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”111  
 This remarkable retreat from the formulaic approach the 
Seventh Circuit had employed since Mykytiuk did not last for long, 
however. Less than a month after Demaree, the court ruled in United 
States v. Hankton that “the presumption that a correctly calculated 
Guidelines sentence is reasonable not only applies to the appellate 
standard of reasonableness review, but also serves as a benchmark for 
trial judges in evaluating whether or not a Guidelines sentence is 
appropriate.”112 
Judge Coffey, writing for the court, made clear that the only 
time a sentencing judge even need consider the § 3553(a) factors is 
                                                 
108 Id. at 794 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 794-95. 
111 Id. 
112 United States v. Hankton, 463 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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when the defendant provides convincing argument as to why they 
should apply.113 
 Finally, the court in United States v. Gonzalez showed a 
marked unwillingness to even consider a within-the-guidelines 
sentence as unreasonable.114 In stark contrast to the concession in 
Mykytiuk that the “door must be left open” to the possibility of a 
sentence falling within the Guidelines being unreasonable, Judge 
Posner seems to discount the possibility that anything other than a 
departure from the Guidelines justify such a finding.115 According to 
Judge Posner, a sentencing judge’s lack of consideration for § 3553(a) 
factors was not enough to even raise the question that a within-the-
Guidelines sentence may be unreasonable.116 Merely citing various § 
3553(a) factors that the defendant raised, but were not addressed by 
the sentencing court, is insufficient to challenge a sentence as 
unreasonable.117 Judge Posner even goes so far as to characterize 
appeals of this kind as a “waste [of] time”.118  This approach seems to 
conflict with Judge Posner’s own warnings against sentencing judges 
using the presumption as a shortcut to avoid addressing more 
individualized, and time consuming, sentencing factors.119 
 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF THE GUIDELINES WITHIN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are 
granted limited to the following Questions: 1) Was the 
district court's choice of within-Guidelines sentence 
reasonable? 2) In making that determination, is it 
consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
                                                 
113 Id. 




118 Id. at 756. 
119 United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).    
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(2005), to accord a presumption of reasonableness to 
within-Guidelines sentences? 3) If so, can that 
presumption justify a sentence imposed without an 
explicit analysis by the district court of the 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(a) factors and any other factors that might justify 
a lesser sentence?120 
 
In the time since Booker’s remedy was instituted, Justice 
Scalia’s predictions of a “discordant symphony of different standards” 
has proven somewhat accurate.121  Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a presumption of 
reasonableness for sentences falling within the Guidelines.122  The 
First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the 
presumption, but have generally given the Guidelines some level of 
deference.123  
The Supreme Court has decided to address this Circuit split as 
well as other issues left unresolved by Booker in two upcoming cases: 
Rita v. United States and Claiborne v. United States.124  In Rita, the 
Court will address directly whether a presumption of reasonableness 
for within-the-Guidelines sentences is consistent with the Court’s 
Booker decision.125  If the Court determines that the presumption is 
consistent with Booker, it will go on to determine if that presumption 
is enough to justify a sentence without an explicit analysis of the § 
                                                 
120 Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 551 (Mem) (2006) 
121  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122  See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Smith, 440 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706 (6th 
Cir. 2006; United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Tabor, 439 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kristl 437 F.3d 1050 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
123 See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 
324 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, 434 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006).    
124 --- U.S. ----, (2007); --- U.S. ----, (2007). 
125 Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 551 (Mem) (2006). 
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3553(a) factors that may merit a different sentence.126  The current 
makeup of the Court suggests that whatever the specific outcome, a 
modification of Booker’s remedy may be likely.  Only Justices Breyer, 
Kennedy, and Ginsburg remain of Booker’s remedial majority, while 
all four dissenting Justices remain. 
The Seventh Circuit has not been unresponsive to the Supreme 
Court’s recent actions.127  In United States v. Gama-Gonzales, Judge 
Easterbrook offered an opinion meant perhaps as both a summation 
and a defense of the Seventh Circuit’s position.128  He explained in the 
court’s opinion that “[t]o say that a sentence within the range is 
presumptively is reasonable is not to say that district judges ought to 
impose sentences within the range.  It is only to say that, if the district 
judge does use the Guidelines, then the sentence is unlikely to be 
problematic.”129  Using an interesting logic, Judge Easterbrook argued 
that by granting the presumption, the Seventh Circuit is merely using 
the increased sentencing discretion granted by Booker.130  “One 
permissible use of discretion[,]” according to Judge Easterbrook, “is to 
start with the Guidelines' framework, which is designed to curtail 
unjustified disparity in sentences--for avoiding unjustified disparity is 
one of the statutory objectives.”131  
Gama-Gonzales’ most notable defense of the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach comes from Judge Easterbrook’s minimization of the 
presumption’s effect.132  Distilling the Seventh Circuit’s position, he 
wrote that “[w]hen saying that sentences within the Guidelines are 
presumptively reasonable, we mean no more than the modest 
proposition that district judges generally possess the discretion under § 
                                                 
126 Id.   
127 See United States v. Gama-Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2006). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 1110 (citations omitted, emphasis original). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1111. 
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3553(a) and Booker to follow the Guidelines, if they so choose, 




Despite the Seventh Circuit’s assurances of the presumption’s 
innocuous nature, Judge Easterbrook’s clarification in Gama-Gonzalez 
begs the question:  if the presumption is nothing more than a rather 
generalized statement of a sentencing judge’s discretionary powers, 
why is it necessary at all?  The uniformity of sentencing and judicial 
economy offered by granting sentences falling within the Guidelines a 
presumption of reasonableness are certainly legitimate rewards.  Those 
rewards, however, also carry the danger that the Guidelines will 
become a shelter for sentencing judges wishing to avoid the 
complexity of individualized sentencing, and a justification for the 
appellate court to evade § 3553(a) factors.   
As Judge Posner warned in United States v. Cunningham, “the 
temptation to a busy judge to impose the guidelines sentence and be 
done with it, without wading into the vague and prolix statutory 
factors, cannot be ignored.”134  By adopting the presumption of 
reasonableness, the Seventh Circuit has indulged that temptation in a 
way that allows the court to continue to extol the advisory nature of 
the Guidelines, the vitality of the § 3553(a) factors, and the discretion 
of sentencing judges while simultaneously undermining each.   
 
 
                                                 
133 Id. (emphasis original). 
134 United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).    
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